Yesterday, Ross Douthat made the case against Hillary
Clinton. As it happens, the case he made was not really very strong. He argued
that Hillary is an establishment type and that with her we will have more of
the same. Even if you believe that the same is not very good and that we are
sorely in need of a course change, you must recognize that more of the same is at
least familiar. Most people, given the choice, will choose the familiar over
the strange.
One might say that the Hillary candidacy harkens back to the
days of the first Clinton administration, but most people did not have it so
bad during those times. It might be wrong to give Bill Clinton all the credit,
but he—unlike the current POTUS-- worked effectively with Republicans in
Congress and even signed a number of the laws that arose from the Contract with
America.
True, Clinton was
impeached for lying under oath and that much of America was disgusted by the
way he treated women, but Republicans, dare I say, have recently lost all
credibility on the question.
As it happens, Douthat believes that the American foreign
policy establishment, in particular, made grievous errors over the past
decades. In that he echoes an article penned by Angelo Codevilla in the Claremont
Review of Books.
To read Codevilla you would think that everyone who has been
in charge of American foreign policy has thought the same thoughts and implemented
the same policies. And that they have all been wrong. One hesitates to embrace
unthinkingly such a broad brush indictment.
To return to Douthat, here is his case against Hillary:
The
dangers of a Hillary Clinton presidency are more familiar than Trump’s
authoritarian unknowns, because we live with them in our politics already.
They’re the dangers of elite groupthink, of Beltway power worship, of a cult of
presidential action in the service of dubious ideals. They’re the dangers of a
recklessness and radicalism that doesn’t recognize itself as either, because
it’s convinced that if an idea is mainstream and commonplace among the great
and good then it cannot possibly be folly.
Unlike Codevilla, Douthat limited his indictment to the last
15 years:
Almost
every crisis that has come upon the West in the last 15 years has its roots in
this establishmentarian type of folly. The Iraq War, which liberals prefer to
remember as a conflict conjured by a neoconservative cabal, was actually the
work of a bipartisan interventionist consensus, pushed hard by George W. Bush
but embraced as well by a large slice of center-left opinion that included Tony
Blair and more than half of Senate Democrats.
Likewise
the financial crisis: Whether you blame financial-services deregulation or
happy-go-lucky housing policy (or both), the policies that helped inflate and
pop the bubble were embraced by both wings of the political establishment.
Likewise with the euro, the European common currency, a terrible idea that only
cranks and Little Englanders dared oppose until the Great Recession exposed it
as a potentially economy-sinking folly. Likewise with Angela Merkel’s grand
and reckless open-borders gesture just last year: She was the heroine
of a thousand profiles even as she delivered her continent to polarization and
violence.
And, of course, there are other problems:
This
record of elite folly — which doesn’t even include lesser case studies like our
splendid little war in Libya — is a big part of why the United States has a
“let’s try crazy” candidate in this election, and why there are so many
Trumpian parties thriving on European soil.
He continued:
Indeed
what is distinctive about Clinton, more even than Bush or Obama, is how few
examples there are of her ever breaking with the elite consensus on matters of
statecraft.
She was
for the Iraq War when everyone was for it, against the surge when everyone had
given up on Iraq, and then an unchastened liberal hawk again in Libya just a
few short years later.
She was
a Russia dove when the media mocked Mitt Romney for being a Russia hawk; now she’s
a Russia hawk along with everyone else in Washington in a moment that
might require de-escalation.
She
cites Merkel as a model leader, she’s surrounded by a bipartisan foreign policy
cadre that’s eager for a Details
To Be Determine descalation in Syria, and she seems — like her Goldman
Sachs audiences — intent on sailing serenely above the storm of nationalism
rather than reconsidering any of the assumptions of her class.
Saying that Hillary Clinton has been hanging around with the
wrong crowd does not feel very persuasive. Douthat might have noted the stench
of corruption that surrounds her and that has infested the FBI and the Justice
Department. And he might have asked whether she is competent. Surely,
that is a more pertinent issue. Sinecures are one thing. Concrete achievements
are quite another.
Douthat seems to believe that Hillary can be discredited for
having the wrong ideas. I think it will take more. If it is even possible any
more. If the election were being run as a battle between ideas, Trump would be
winning. Unfortunately, it is a battle between two people. On that score Trump
has not presented himself as the candidate of ideas or of competence.
The people in charge of American foreign policy have made
significant errors—Codevilla lists them in excruciating detail—but it does
not seem fair to lump them all together. Hasn’t there been a significant divide
in the foreign policy establishment, between idealists and realists for a
century at least?
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson did not see the world
the same way. We saw how Wilson dealt with World War I and we can read what
Roosevelt would have done in four volumes of contemporaneous newspaper columns.
The difference was stark. Surely, we know that the American Senate rejected the
call to join the Wilsonian (and Kantian) folly called the League of Nations.
In England Neville Chamberlin and Winston Churchill did not
see the threat of Nazism the same way. In America, Dwight Eisenhower and John
Kennedy did not act in the same way when they were presented the chance to
intervene in Vietnam.
Like it or not, the fall of Communism presented America with
an enormous foreign policy challenge. As it happened G. H. W. Bush handled the
crisis skillfully. No one really pays it much mind. Historians prefer
chaos and drama to effective leadership.
Codevilla offered his indictment:
Since
Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Democratic and Republican statesmen have confused
America’s interest with mankind’s. In practice, they have taken upon themselves
the role of mankind’s stewards (or sheriffs, leaders, pillars of order, or
whatever) and acted as if, in Wilson’s words, America has “no reason for being”
except to “stand for the right of men,” to be “champions of humanity.”
Accordingly, a series of statesmen has forsaken war and diplomacy for strictly
American ends and with means adequate to achieve them, and adopted foredoomed
schemes pursued halfheartedly—Charles Evans Hughes (commitment to China’s
integrity and renunciation of the means to uphold it), Franklin Roosevelt
(seeking world co-domination with Stalin and the U.N. to banish “ancient evils,
ancient ills”), Harry Truman (pursuing peace through no-win war in Korea),
Nixon/Kissinger (scuttling Vietnam to help entice the Soviets into a grand detente), George W. Bush
(democratizing the Middle East because America can’t be free unless and until
the whole world is free).
True enough, George W. Bush got caught up in the ideological
fervor when he announced that he would bring liberal democracy to the Middle
East. But, Nixon and Kissinger drew down the Vietnam War because the American people
were no longer willing to fight it. And, de-escalating Vietnam surely had
something to do with the diplomatic opening with China. That must surely count
for something.
Some presidents have pursued policies based on idealism, on
the notion that we are all citizens of the world. Others have pursued
balance-of-power realism and nationalism in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Yet, Codevilla throws it all into the same basket. He
concludes that we should support Trump because he going to break things up and overthrow the
establishment elites. One might ask with whom he is going to do this. One might
ask which foreign policy experts will know enough to do it efficiently and
effectively.
We can make the case against Hillary’s incompetence and
corruption. We can make a case that she has done poorly in just about all of her
undertakings. One can argue against her by looking at the horrors that have
befallen the Middle East, in Syria, in Iraq, during the Arab Spring, since she
and Obama—another rank amateur—took charge of American foreign policy. One can
argue against her, not merely for pursuing ideals, but for implementing
policies that signified, not American idealism, but American weakness around
the world.
But, to argue for Trump on the grounds that he will be a
bull in the china shop fails to see that no matter how incompetent Hillary is,
she does seem familiar. A country has to be in miserably bad shape to take the
risk that Trump would represent. And if it is in really bad shape, we would want
to hire someone with demonstrated competence in foreign affairs. If the ship of
state is sinking you want a captain who has navigated a ship before.
Codevilla supports Trump. He is right to say that Hillary
will not cause the world to respect America. Not so much because of her ideas
but because of who she is and how she got the job. World leaders might fear a
Donald Trump more, because he is far less predictable, but if you believe that
they would not relish the chance to take him down, you are simply wrong. He of
the orange bouffant hairdo, he who is woefully underinformed about all foreign
policy matters, will not restore respect for America.
Codevilla is quite right to say that we have lost the habit
of winning wars. We no longer see conflict in terms of winning and losing. And
yet, we did win the Cold War… even if crypto- Marxist ideas risk taking over the
minds of America’s youth. We even won the first Gulf War. In fact, as Barack
Obama himself said, the Iraq War had been concluded successfully… until he
chose to surrender the victory.
Having created a monster, Codevilla suggests that anything
is better:
The 2016
election is about whether that pattern should change. How much, if at all, it
would change under Trump matters much less than the mere possibility it might change. Trump’s virtue in
foreign policy lies in having voiced this simple, vital thought: U.S. foreign
policy must put America first, and deliver victories rather than defeats.
Whether Trump really believes that, whether he would act on it, or even whether
he understands past mistakes, is secondary.
As of today, most Americans disagree.