As Chinese premier Xi Jinping makes his way to Washington,
we are reminded that, among his notable efforts, he has wanted to return China
to Confucian principles.
The Economist had the story last year. I duly posted about it on the blog.
Now the Wall Street Journal is noticing:
One
Thursday morning in June, 200 senior officials crammed into an auditorium in
the Communist Party’s top training academy to study a revolutionary idea at the
heart of President Xi
Jinping’s vision for China.
They
didn’t come to brush up on Marx, Lenin or Mao, staple fodder at
the Central Party School since the 1950s. Nor were they honing their grasp of
the state-guided capitalism that defined the nation for the last 35 years.
They
came to hear Wang Jie, a professor of ancient Chinese philosophy and
a figure in the country’s next ideological wave: a renaissance of the
traditional culture the Communist Party once sought to destroy.
According to the Journal, Xi is trying to “inoculate” China against Western ideas like individual freedom and democracy. One suspects that
he also wants to fend off the idea of human rights.
In truth, Confucian thought has a place for individual
freedom. It allows people to use discretion when it comes to obeying or not obeying
the rules. Because it gave a place to liberty Confucian thought has for
millennia been subjected to occasional pogroms, beginning with the first Chin
emperor and extending through Mao’s Cultural Revolution.
What is Confucianism about? The Journal answers:
Thought
to have lived in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., Confucius emphasized
respect for elders, social ritual and personal moral virtue, including among
leaders.
Filial piety, check. Performance of public and social
rituals, regardless of whether you like it or not, check. Leaders who try to
instill virtue by setting a good example, not be drowning the nation in
bureaucratic regulation and threats of punishment, check.
It is not an accident that Xi Jinping, as part of his return
to Confucius has launched an anti-corruption drive that has already brought
down some high ranking public officials and party notables.
And, Xi is also concerned with presenting a good public
image abroad, an image of a nation of decent people living in an honorable nation.
So far, so good. This morning, however Journal columnist
Bret Stephens offers up a somewhat different take on China. He does not see the
need for a return for Confucian values. He proposes that China adopt more American
values and a more American governmental system, with checks and balances.
Stephens sees in China an ungodly mess, led by a man who is
not up to the job. One wonders whether or not he is thinking of another nation,
but, be that as it may, he writes:
Now
your stock market has fizzled, your economy is sinking under the weight of unsustainable debts and zombie companies, your
neighbors despise you, and every affluent Chinese is getting a second passport
and snapping up a foreign home. Even in Beijing, word is out that behind that
enigmatic smile you’re a man overmatched by your job. And out of your depth.
This smacks of caricature, because, while it is nice to say
that China could have achieved what it has achieved in the past three or four
decades by enacting the American constitution, one retains some skepticism about
the portability of political systems. However wonderful liberal democracy, it
has no real roots in Chinese culture.
And besides, even in the West, the course of industrial development never did
run smooth. Let’s accept that the Chinese economy is on the brink—its detractors
have been saying that it’s on the brink for decades now—we recall that the
advanced industrial economy of the United States has suffered the occasional
market crash and great depression.
According to Stephens America prospers and thrives because
it does not value such shopworn values like virtuous leaders. One might retort that those who want to make
America great again are not exactly thrilled with the nation’s latest
achievements or its moral fiber.
One would like to think that Stephens is being ironic, here,
but one suspects that he isn’t:
Yes,
America, perhaps the only country on earth that can be serially led by second-
or third-rate presidents—and somehow always manage to come up trumps (so to
speak). America, where half of college-age Americans can’t find New York state on a map—even as those same
young Americans lead the world in innovation. America, where Cornel West is
celebrated as an intellectual, Miley Cyrus as an artist, Jonathan Franzen as
a novelist and Kim
Kardashian as a beauty—and yet remains the cultural dynamo of the
world.
It gives you hope for the future of America, doesn’t it? Or
else, you might say that this mess of silliness is precisely the reason why
other countries do not want to adopt American values. How can a culture be
dynamic when it sees Cornell West as an intellectual and Miley Cyrus as an
artist? It might not be suffering from financial corruption—for now we will
leave the question open—but it is certainly suffering from cultural and
intellectual corruption, from an encroaching decadence coupled with an
overestimation of mediocrity.
Stephens suggests that America is great, despite the
nonsense it produces, because its political system corrals the harsh tendencies
and counterbalances them. One might ask how it happened, then that the Obama
Iran deal is going to be enacted even though it is not supported by a majority
of Congress.
Stephens also believes that China has been glorying in
Confucianism, in a series of virtuous leaders. Previous stories in the Journal
among other publications—see above-- have suggested that Confucianism is making
a comeback, not that it offers up the ruling principles:
America,
in short, which defies every ethic of excellence—all the discipline and cunning
and delicacy and Confucian wisdom that are the ways by which status and
power are gained in China—yet manages to produce excellence the way a salmon
spawns eggs.
Is the country really producing that much excellence? Most
people are persuaded that we are headed in the wrong direction. The economic
recovery after the Great Recession was the most anemic in the post-war period,
and people are enraged at the abuse of power and should be enraged at the flood
of regulations that are damaging their economic prospects, Stephens feels just
a wee bit too optimistic. We have produced more than our fair share of rotten
eggs.
Especially, when he declares that we are experts at failure:
As for
Americans, we’re the failure experts. We expect it, forgive it, often celebrate
it. We do this partly because we’re soft, but also out of hardheadedness. If
tolerance of failure is a prerequisite for success, then you need to love your
failures as much as you do your successes.
Has anyone been more capable of overcoming political and
economic failure than Deng Xiaoping? After all, he was a leader in Mao’s
government and one of the first to try to institute economic reforms after its
failures.
You might also ask yourself whether our government, in its
current form has been giving us the best leadership available. Is there any way
to measure the calamities that have been and will be visited on the world by
the leadership of one Barack Obama? Stephens ought to be the first to notice
that the situation in the Middle East and the European refugee crisis will
remake the world in ways that are not favorable to traditional American
values. Does anyone seriously think that we should love the failure of the
Obama administration’s Middle East policy?
Stephens tries to make inadequate American presidents a
virtue:
Limited
government has another advantage, Mr. President. It means limited
responsibility. Even George W. Bush’s
or Barack Obama’s
angriest critics can’t quite blame them for everything (though the Bush critics try). U.S. presidents don’t have the mandate of heaven, so
they don’t have the burden of it, either.
What is the virtue in limited responsibility? Why do we make it easy for people to evade responsibility? Would it not
be better if the record of achievement were more substantial? As for the “mandate
of heaven” it is roughly equivalent to the consent of the governed, something
that was granted in traditional China to a dynasty. When a dynasty loses the
mandate of heaven the social fabric begins to disintegrate and a new dynasty
will be called on to take over. Also, traditionally, the sign that a dynasty
has lost the mandate of heaven is a massive calamity, like Hurricane Katrina,
which cost George W. Bush the mandate of heaven. Hmmm.
On the other hand, America enjoys a level of political
stability that is rightfully the envy of the world. Foreigners, including many
Chinese, buy condos in America because they consider it a refuge, a safe haven.
They are persuaded that their money will be safe in America and that no one is
going to come along to confiscate their property. Even with the Kelo decision
they have more confidence in America than they do in their home countries.
Compared to all other countries America is politically very
stable. As it happens, the price of real estate is not exactly stable; it is
driven by the market. The government will never confiscate your money here, but
the market very well might. Some of us
are old enough to remember when, forty years ago, co-op apartments that are now
worth in the tens of millions were being sold for the tens of thousands.
As for the situation in China, without offering an extended
analysis, the series of leaders who followed Deng Xiaoping have been seriously
competent people. The jury is still out on Xi, but in the space of three plus
decades they have dragged China—kicking and screaming—out of feudalism into the
role of world leader and economic dynamo.
Could they have done it quicker and better by adopting the
American constitution? They did not and they should be judged by what they
accomplished, not for having failed to emulate America.
As I said, I would like to think that Stephens is being
ironic. I hope he is. But if that is the best case for today’s America, one
understands why Xi is not coming here to learn about the ways of democracy, the
ways of a lawsuit culture, the ways of stifling bureaucratic regulations, the
ways of cultural decadence and a corrupted marketplace of ideas.
No, he is coming here to measure for the drapes.
7 comments:
http://www.unz.com/jpetras/us-china-relations-the-pentagon-versus-high-tech/
Stopped reading your article the second Bret Stephens' name appeared. That name renders anything that follows totally irrelevant.
Agree with Sum. Bret Stephens went totally crazy from TDS (Trump Derangement Syndrome). Who can believe anything he says?
I saw the WSJ article too, and I'm interested in the question of authoritarian governments.
WSJ: Chinese officials have portrayed all this as part of a quest to identify China’s distinct “cultural genes” and to re-establish China not just as a strong nation, but also as a civilization with its own core values on a par with the West. They also have suggested they see it as a new way to justify China’s authoritarian government—as an extension of an ancient political tradition—and to tackle corruption.
And Stuart also questions the libertarian principle of limited goverment also in limiting accountability of leaders.
Stuart: What is the virtue in limited responsibility? Why do we make it easy for people to evade responsibility? Would it not be better if the record of achievement were more substantial? As for the “mandate of heaven” it is roughly equivalent to the consent of the governed, something that was granted in traditional China to a dynasty. When a dynasty loses the mandate of heaven the social fabric begins to disintegrate and a new dynasty will be called on to take over.
I guess the question I'd ask is how scapegoats fit into the Confucian social model. It might be nice for a strong leader to execute or inprison people after a crisis or disaster, or change the rules of trading when too many people are selling and threatening social chaos, or "shoot the messenger" when media tells people what's happening versus what officially is allowed to happen.
And the whole problem of authoritarianism is how a transfer of power happens, or how it can happen without violence. How many millions of people died in the last Chinese revolution, or when the communistic top-down farming directives left massive starvation?
Last, I'm not very happy by the subtle fear-mongering that the president of China is coming here to "measure the drapes", i.e. preparing an invasion of some sort, but if you look at the environmental destruction caused in the last decades in China, you might believe the president of China is looking for his own escape plans to America when the next revolution happens.
But that escape from accountability is probably not a very Confucian ideal. Do good Confucians act like captains and go down with their ship?
The later "neo-confucianism" is in a sense the inverse of "confucianism." Confucius emphasized the responsibilities of the father towards the son, the older brother to the younger brother, the husband to the wife, and the ruler to the people. Neo-confucianists emphasize the duties of the son to the father, the younger brother to the older brother, the wife to the husband, and the people to the ruler. I think that Xi is seeking a re-infusion of "neo-confucianism," not confucianism.
My understanding, according to the sources I have, is that filial piety involved both. Confucius emphasized respect for parents and ancestors and for those older and wiser. But he also emphasizes that those older and wiser had a duty to treat young people and their inferiors with benevolence.
p.s. Here's a grim article about China's plight, as Chinese premier Xi Jinping comes to "measure for the drapes". A return to Confucius might save China, but its not going to make the necessary 7% growth rate a reality.
The ex-asset manager Nate Hagens said in regards to peak oil "We’re not really facing a shortage of energy, we’re facing a longage of expectations." I imagine China's in the same position, but times ten. The future will never be big enough for all the growth needed to pay back all the debt we're creating.
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Two years ago, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) delivered a simple message to the people: Pursue the Chinese Dream. The exact details were fuzzy, but it went something like this: work hard, be proud, and you will get rich.
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This year, nearly 7.5 million fresh Chinese university graduates entered the workforce, or attempted to. But because of the massive influx of new labor, increased year on year, competition has become cutthroat even as salaries have fallen, in some cases, lower than the wages received by factory workers. Cost of living continues to increase in tier-one cities, and prospects for members of the ant tribe eventually to own their own houses are slim. “I’ll never be able to get married and provide for a family. I feel like I’ll always be stuck in these six square meters,” groaned Xiao. Rent is ¥1300, or about US$200, a month. That may not seem like much, but after other expenses, most of Xiao’s ¥3,300 ($520) paycheck is gone.
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In Chinese culture, there’s an idea that bitterness forges a good person, and the Chinese Dream encompasses this concept. Young people are taught that they need to chi ku, eat bitterness—bear hardships. They’re promised that life is xian ku hou tian, bitter first and sweet later. They’re also told that to be a man among men, one must eat the bitterest of bitters. These are hearty motivational lines that parents and grandparents share with children and grandchildren, but the post-80s generation sees those words as a little outmoded. It’s not that the advice has fallen on deaf ears. It’s that the ant tribe sees no end in sight. The “sweetness” promised by their elders is too far-fetched, but giving up and going home means letting go of the slim opportunities that a first-tier city might offer them.
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Xi Jinping’s crusade against corruption has “swatted flies” and “hunted tigers,” who conveniently are the Chinese leader’s political enemies. China’s millionaires can’t leave the country fast enough.
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Young Chinese men and women are proud of their nation, but not of their government. The CCP is pulling out all the stops to convince the world that this is not the case, but as long as Beijing's policies leave people like Xiao behind, the edicts and actions of Party leadership will carry little meaning for some of the hardest workers in China.
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