When Hurricane Sandy hit New York I was immediately reminded
of Nicholas Nassim Taleb’s concept of black swan events.
Writing in the Wall Street Journal yesterday Taleb explained
them:
Several
years before the financial crisis descended on us, I put forward the concept of
"black swans": large events that are both unexpected and highly
consequential. We never see black swans coming, but when they do arrive, they
profoundly shape our world: Think of World War I, 9/11, the Internet, the rise
of Google
Obviously, Taleb does not limit black swans to great
calamities. His definition comprises events that remake our world in ways that we cannot
predict.
In his words:
In
economic life and history more generally, just about everything of consequence
comes from black swans; ordinary events have paltry effects in the long term.
Still, through some mental bias, people think in hindsight that they "sort
of" considered the possibility of such events; this gives them confidence
in continuing to formulate predictions. But our tools for forecasting and risk
measurement cannot begin to capture black swans. Indeed, our faith in these
tools make it more likely that we will continue to take dangerous, uninformed
risks.
How then are we to prepare for unpredictable events? Or
better, Taleb asks, why do we find ourselves so unprepared for great
natural disasters?
He responds by saying that our ability to respond
effectively to such events has been compromised by our love of security. We
have tried to wring the stress out of life and thus we have become so rigid
that when stress arrives we are unprepared.
Taleb applies the principle to everyday life and also to
Alan Greenspan’s efforts to use the power of the Fed to smooth out the business
cycle:
In his words:
We all
know that the stressors of exercise are necessary for good health, but people
don't translate this insight into other domains of physical and mental
well-being. We also benefit, it turns out, from occasional and intermittent
hunger, short-term protein deprivation, physical discomfort and exposure to extreme
cold or heat. Newspapers discuss post-traumatic stress disorder, but nobody
seems to account for post-traumatic growth. Walking on smooth surfaces with
"comfortable" shoes injures our feet and back musculature: We need
variations in terrain.
Modernity
has been obsessed with comfort and cosmetic stability, but by making ourselves
too comfortable and eliminating all volatility from our lives, we do to our
bodies and souls what Mr. Greenspan did to the U.S. economy: We make them
fragile.
Inflexibility makes you rigid. Too much inflexibility makes you brittle.
Flexibility makes you
resilient. Too much flexibility makes you mush.
If you have learned how to deal with minor stresses you will be much
more competent to deal with major stresses.
Taleb is not arguing for constant stress or for complete
insecurity. He seems to be seeking a middle ground between two extremes—complete
security and complete insecurity.
As one of the commenters on the Journal site remarked, we
need to find what Aristotle called the mean between two extreme positions.
In the matter of Hurricane Sandy the Huffington Post offered
an excellent article explaining how failed government policies made the storm
much worse than it had to be.
On the one extreme, governments allowed developers to build
anything they wanted on vulnerable beachfront property. Overbuilding in storm
areas and flood zones always causes excessive damage.
On the other extreme, the government became so excessively
rigid that it could not take the steps necessary to protect the city by burying electrical cables or building sea
walls.
As for disaster preparation, government officials knew that
the storm was coming but they seriously underestimated the damage that it could
cause.
The Huffington Post reports:
Despite
ample warning from forecasters that conditions were set for a record storm
surge, when Sandy finally swept ashore on the eastern seaboard two weeks ago it
still caught many officials and residents badly off guard. Evacuations stumbled
in places like Atlantic City, where mixed messages from city and state leaders
convinced many to ride out the storm with little understanding of its expected
severity.
New
York City, which saw the most deaths directly linked to the surge, also
faltered in its efforts to get residents to safety. City officials waited until
the day before the storm hit to order a mandatory evacuation of flood zones,
then told 40 city-run elderly and adult care facilities in mandatory evacuation
zones to ignore the order and ride out the storm.
Some
residents said the last-minute evacuation order and the decision not to
evacuate the city's nursing homes fed a belief that the storm would not be much
more severe than Hurricane Irene, which caused only moderate flooding in the
city.
Having exposed far too many homeowners to catastrophe and
having failed to take steps it could have taken to protect the city, government
officials tended to underestimate the storm’s potential to damage the city.
2 comments:
Highly relevant article, I think. Also relevant, as a separate issue, is the concept of deigning for resilience as more important than "low footprint" - which ALSO involves designing for a range of possibilities to give you the best possibility of dealing with whatever comes up.
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4699
The occurrence of cyclones in the North Atlantic is not an uncommon event. The New England area has been affected by other storms in the past several decades and the most damaging storm less than a century earlier.
The real threat was not posed by the cyclone, but by the failure of people to adequately prepare to mitigate a known risk. The risk was not speculative or theoretical. It was known (by a surviving generation) and predictable.
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