Clearly, the hollowing out of the American middle class is
bad news. A nation divided between the rich and the rest is not going to be a
very efficient, effective or harmonious place.
According to Adam Davidson, we have lost the middle class
because we have given up on bureaucratic hierarchy. In particular, we have been
trying to surpass the hierarchical organization that exists in the military. With
it we have lost middle management and much of the middle class.
Since the traditional American corporate hierarchies were
modeled on the military, a culture that disparages all things military will lose
its middle class. It’s an intriguing notion.
Surely, it is important that the New York Times publishing such
a favorable story about the Army War College. Much of the contempt that many
Americans feel for the military and for corporate hierarchies derives from the
Vietnam era anti-militarism—supported, among others, by major media outlets
like the New York Times.
Military hierarchies also fell out of fashion when new business models were introduced. Among them, Hollywood
and high tech. Hollywood movie productions involve collections of free lancers
who come together for a project and who then disperse. And, high tech companies
are supposed to be far more free-wheeling than the military, disparaging such things as uniforms,
working together in the same place and salutes. Their leaders seem to believe in
creativity more than in regimentation.
And yet, one can only wonder how much of this debate has
been skewed by bias. Military organizations have not gone out of
style. And paramilitary organizations are seriously in vogue in our age of
terrorism. Davidson does well to ask what we can learn from military
cultures, especially in an increasingly competitive world.
After all, these organizations are involved in the most
serious forms of competition. If they malfunction, the consequences are dire.
What works or doesn’t work in the military often has
considerable impact on cultural values and thus on social organizations.
Davidson does not mention it, but we do have the bureaucratic hierarchy called government. If the
corporate hierarchy is becoming less prevalent, government hierarchy is becoming more intrusive and invasive. In effect, government is involved in competition,
but only indirectly. In principle, government exists to serve the people, to
help the nation to function efficiently and effectively, to allow the private
economy to create wealth and compete against other nations and
civilizations.
And yet, sometimes the government bureaucracy becomes a parasitic
organism that sucks the life out of the economy. Then, it will rationalize its
activities by saying that it is helping the nation to live up to its ideals. Any
deviation from perfection in the marketplace is considered reason for the government to expand, to
step in and to take control. Adherents of big government will tell you that
only government regulations can prevent the nation from becoming a dog-eat-dog,
law-of-the-jungle world. Government is supposed to protect us from our worst
tendencies.
Government hierarchies can be efficient and effective or
they can be inefficient and ineffective; they can help the nation to produce
wealth and to compete in the world markets or they can make it more difficult
for the nation to produce wealth and to compete in world markets.
We all know that corporations expend considerable effort to influence government policy and regulations. But, sometimes government
workers unions buy politicians who then negotiate extremely generous
compensation packages for their workers an expand government so that the unions
can have more members. Government officials beholden to labor unions must also
raise taxes in order to shift money from the private economy to themselves. Whatever one thinks of military hierarchies, government bureaucracies have not exactly been showing themselves to be models
of efficiency.
America today has far more government workers per capita
than China. What does that tell you?
It says that government bureaucracies no longer live by the
laws of competition. They no longer allow themselves to be judged by how well
the nation is faring in economic competition. And especially, by how well the nation's people have access to gainful employment and a middle class life style.
If the nation is not competitive, the bureaucrats will say
that the reason lies in the fact that it does not have big enough government.
For those who believe in big government, it never does anything wrong.
When it comes to taxes, the rich do not really care. They have so much money and so many ways to shelter it that it
makes no difference if a government raises taxes. And keep in mind, the poor do
not pay taxes. They receive transfer payments and welfare payments from the
government. The burden of taxation, to the extent that it impacts lifestyle,
falls on the middle class, or better, on the upper middle class.
Do high taxes and regulation suck money from the middle
class? Of course, they do. Do high taxes and regulations make it more difficult
for companies to hire and promote and invest in employees? Of course, they do.
If we are going to examine what happens when a nation
rejects military hierarchies we need also to examine what happens when politicians
and government bureaucrats are less than efficient and when they reject taking
any responsibility for the state of the national economy.
If the middle class is declining, one of the few remaining
remnants lies in government bureaucrats.
In the meantime, Davidson draws some useful lessons from the
Army War College. He proposes that we rebuild the American middle class by
taking lessons from the military, by using it as a role model.
He opens with a reflection about the difference between strategy
and tactics. Apparently, corporate America has embraced this distinction
without really knowing what it is:
In
modern business, ‘‘thinking strategically’’ has become a cliché entirely devoid
of meaning. But in the military, its meaning remains quite precise. As one
person in the class told me, as a lieutenant colonel in a tank battalion, he
was engaged in tactics: making sure that his tankers and their tanks were ready
to fight. As a colonel, he would be concerned with strategy: advising on which
enemies those tanks should engage and how.
Allowing higher level executives to deal with strategy while
charging lower level executives with the tactics produces a hierarchy of
responsibilities:
Interestingly,
as laid out in what may be the single most important book of American business
history, Alfred Chandler’s ‘‘The Visible Hand,’’ this military model was copied
a century ago as the model for the hierarchical American corporation. In
particular, these organizations borrowed the delineation between executives
tasked with strategy — the corporate equivalent of colonels and generals — and
tactical workers (enlisted soldiers) and midlevel managers, who played the role
of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels.
American corporations often reject the military model because
it is too slow. In the modern tech world information must flow
more quickly between different managers. Moreover, decision-making is more
widely distributed throughout the organization and people throughout the
organization can make executive decisions:
But
then came global trade, computers and the Internet, and we learned that the
military-inspired corporate hierarchy didn’t work so well when information
needed to flow far more quickly throughout an organization and decisions had to
be made with haste. Many of the structural economic challenges we face today
can be explained by the decline of this organizational form. Uber, Airbnb and
Google are examples of new corporate forms that scramble the roles of managers
and managed, strategy and tactics. There has been a continuous onslaught, over
the last 40 years, on the midlevel managers Chandler once applauded. They have
been replaced by email and Excel and outsourcing. Even many traditional-seeming
companies brag about their flatter, leaner, less-hierarchical style.
And yet, the military model is not working as well as it
should in America. Subordinates are loath to criticize their superiors and even
withhold information that their superiors do not want to hear.
To do
its job, the military needs middle managers; it needs officers who understand
the strategic vision of their superiors and who can translate it into a plan
for battle. But the bureaucracy could be made more agile and effective if it
was better able to send information up the chain, too, encouraging senior
officers to pay more heed to those middle ranks. Gerras led a discussion of the
many ways the military discourages candor from below.
One is reminded of recent reports to the effect that
military intelligence officers have skewing reports to affirm the views of the
White House. Military officers seem to have gotten the message that it was a
bad career move to report information that the Obama White House did not want
to hear.
With corporate hierarchies going out of fashion, many middle
managers have lost their positions. The notion of making a career at one
company, rising up the corporate hierarchy is also disappearing. This, Davidson
suggests, has hollowed out the middle class. He recommends that corporations go
to school with the military, to learn new ways of functioning:
The
disappearance of middle management is a central part of the disappearance of
the middle class. Without large corporations that have a place for people at
many levels of skill and ability and a reasonably clear path of promotion, tens
of millions of Americans are left underemployed and underpaid. For much of the
20th century, companies would employ young people with few skills and invest in
them, knowing that they would most likely be paid back over the employees’ long
tenure. Today, the United States military is one of the few employers in
America that still makes this kind of investment in a demographically broad
group of people. If we wanted to find a 21st-century form of organization that
can help rebuild the middle class, we would need it to retain at least a little
something from the institution most responsible for building the American
middle class in the first place.
4 comments:
Let's go back to Viet Nam. The war was run from the top--the White House. Not the WH, but higher echelons of the AF decided tactics for the B-52 attacks on Hanoi--all went the same way in, and the same way out. Predictability of tactics leads to predictability of losses. Underlings could see this, but could not affect it.
You might want to look at http://www.jqpublicblog.com/ for current top-down problems.
That's wacky.
Sweden didn't have a powerful military, but it had a solid middle class for a long time. Swedish middle class has been undermined by globalism and diversity.
Post-war Germany abandoned militarism, but it had a huge boom in the Middle Class.
But it's an interesting idea that military ethos and organization had a wider impact on rest of society. Perhaps, the culture of discipline and commitment in the dominant military can shape political, bureaucratic, and business cultures as well.
Japan was a militarist society, and its military culture did define even non-military spheres as well. And Prussia, the most militarized part of Germany, led the way in unification and management of Germany.
I will read the article and comment in depth, but overall, I think believe organization design is extremely important, and in many places has been negatively impacted by fuzzy feel-good thinking. The effect of excessive 'flattening' of organizations leads in practice to a concentration of power in the person at the very top, which greatly slows down the ability to respond rapidly to problems and opportunities.
Historically, the civilian organization type that was first to develop large-scale complex organizations was probably the railroad.
Stuart: America today has far more government workers per capita than China. What does that tell you? ... It says that government bureaucracies no longer live by the laws of competition.
That doesn't look clear to me merely by comparing two numbers. It might help to actually have the numbers, and context of historical numbers.
And this article says the federal workforce is shrinking, not growing.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/13/the-federal-workforce-is-shrinking-but-more-slowly/
And this longer chart shows the percentage of the work force in the federal government has consistently shrunk from 8% in 1945, and down below 3% in 1990, and now hovering over 2%, after a census blip.
http://static4.businessinsider.com/image/4e6a7f1fecad04fd08000053/chart-of-the-day-the-incredible-shrinking-federal-workforce.jpg
Of course that's just federal workers. And it's perhaps still deceptive. I'm betting the government DOES outsource work, and that's a form of competition. I wonder how you count things like privatized prisons? And even a large portion of NASA's money flows to corporations, whether or not they are "lowest bid contracts", I don't know. (I always wondered how you avoid lowest quality work by bid contracts, but of course that's what standards are for, and lawyers.)
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