The Fate of the Atlantic Alliance

For all the caterwauling over Donald Trump’s disdain for the sacrosanct Atlantic alliance, few thinkers have given the matter any serious thought. For our part, we have noted on this blog that Europe, and especially Germany has hardly been siding with the United States on the world stage. After all, Chancellor Merkel’s Russian gas deal has made it a leading supporter of Vladimir Putin. About that salient point, raised over and over again by Trump, American commentators have nothing to say.

Now George Friedman takes a dispassionate look at the German-American strategic alliance. He does not deal in personalities or in political leaders. Yet, his analysis shows the problem that the Trump administration is facing. How can you have a strategic alliance with a nation that serves no important strategic purpose?

Friedman writes:

Hundreds of thousands of Americans have deployed in the wars of the past 17 years. In none of these conflicts, or potential conflicts, did the Germans serve a strategic role. It’s true that more than 50 German soldiers have died in Afghanistan, but the German deployment there, which consists of relatively small detachments under rules of engagement that limit their role severely, is an exception. German rotations to Poland or Romania do not constitute a strategic capability. Should a conflict occur, Germany does not have the ability to make a strategic contribution.

Since NATO was founded, the situation on the ground in Europe has changed. The result is that NATO has lost its relevance:

American indifference to Germany does not arise from domestic politics but from an understanding that it has been a quarter of a century since the fall of the Soviet Union. Europe’s strategic situation has changed utterly. It clings to an institutional framework, NATO, that has lost its relevance. The continued existence of NATO since the Cold War has enabled the Europeans to dedicate more resources to economic development – something they are loathed to give up and Trump is determined to end.

But, you will think… the United States must lead the world toward a more cosmopolitan future. Friedman replies, can we really count on Germany for anything? It does not have a military and might not even allow American troops to use German bases in case of conflict:

[Distinguished German scholar Christian] Hacke argues that the United States is abandoning its long-standing internationalist commitment to Europe. But NATO is a military alliance. To have a military alliance, you must have a military. Germany doesn’t really have one, as Hacke points out. What’s more, it isn’t clear that Germany’s commitment to the alliance is unconditional. I was recently in conversation with national security experts from Europe and the United States. I bought up that if the United States had to rush forces to the Eastern European frontier, they would have to pass through military bases in Germany. I asked if the Germans would permit the free passage of U.S. military forces. The answers ranged from “probably” to “I don’t know.” I assume they would, but the idea that the question would even come up and be answered with less than an absolute “of course” indicates a lack of trust in Germany.

America’s intellectual elites wildly excoriated President Trump for questioning why we should need to defend Montenegro. Friedman explains that, as with most NATO operations, America is bearing the burden and paying the price:

When NATO admitted Montenegro in June 2017, the U.S. became legally obligated to guarantee the security of a country in a region where conflict is always possible. This obligation applies to every NATO member, but the U.S. would shoulder most of the cost. Given all the other interests of the United States, is it unwise to have treaty-based exposure in the Balkans as well, particularly as most of the rest of Europe, especially Germany, would be incapable of honoring its treaty obligations. Europe, on the other hand, hears any call for an adjustment of NATO as a betrayal of the American commitment to European security.

We should perhaps cast a cold eye on Angela Merkel’s Germany and try to evaluate the international situation clearly and objectively. Friedman does so, and he does not resort to partisanship:

The question is not just America’s relationship to Germany, but Germany’s relationship to America. If what Germany wants is American guarantees and capabilities without German capabilities – and therefore without the ability on the part of Germany to fulfill its own guarantees – the relationship will atrophy and ultimately collapse. If Germany wants the strategic partnership to continue, it must become a strategic partner. It must to some extent assist the U.S. globally, and have the force to do so. What is not clear is that this is in German’s interest.

All of this has little to do with the personalities or desires of Trump or German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The United States has burst forth from its continent, while Germany has burrowed down. This makes for very different worldviews.