The Arab Spring Ends in Tunisia

Twelve years ago, when a fruit cart vendor set himself on fire in Tunis, Tunisia, he incited what was called the Arab Spring. The party line was that democracy was coming to the Middle East. For those who thought that liberal democracy would flower across the world, it was a heady moment indeed.

With the Obama administration and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in charge, the movement toward Middle East democracy was bound to fail. When New York Timesmen Thomas Friedman and Nicholas Kristof camped out in downtown Cairo to breathe the air of the new democracy, you could be fairly confident that it would all go wrong.

Today’s story, from the Financial Times, might not be worth more than a footnote in the current civilizational clash between democracy and autocracy, but it is still worth at least one post.

The story is simple. Democracy has failed in Tunisia. It has not failed because people do not have a legal right to vote. It has not failed because of a rigged election. It has failed because democratically elected governments have not produced a functioning economy or good governance.

Democracy is not some gauzy ideal. It will be judged by the outcomes it produces in economic terms.

The Financial Times reports:

Protests over job shortages have been frequent in Tunisia since the uprising that overthrew dictator Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali, in 2011. Rising unemployment and falling living standards have fuelled disillusionment with the country’s democratic experiment among many Tunisians. 

This, analysts say, explains the welcome received by Kais Saied, the populist president elected in 2019, who has since taken steps to increase his power through a new constitution voted in last month. 

Despite opposition warnings that it represented the final unravelling of Tunisia’s democracy, the charter was adopted by referendum on a turnout of 30 per cent amid widespread apathy. “The absence of development has everything to do with this moment [Saied’s restoration of one-man rule],” says Monica Marks, Tunisia specialist and assistant professor at New York University Abu Dhabi. “It is not the whole story, but it is the biggest part of it.”

Since 2011, a succession of weak coalition governments has failed to deliver the jobs, or the improvements to state services and economic prospects, that Tunisians expected under a new democratic era. People in long-neglected inland provinces and the poorer neighbourhoods of coastal cities remain marginalised, facing high unemployment.

As for economic growth since the Arab Spring, it has been dismal:

Economic growth averaged just 1.8 per cent between 2011 and 2020, when it shrank 9.3 per cent because of the pandemic. Unemployment is averaging at 16.8 per cent, rising to 38.5 per cent among the under-25s. The value of the dinar has halved against the dollar since 2011 and inflation is at its highest level for more than 20 years.

So, consider this a footnote, but one that we ought to take seriously. One understands that Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh has been arguing that autocratic and authoritarian regimes will destroy each other, and that democracy is the inevitable wave of the future.

The history of Tunisia suggests otherwise.