Policymaking for Ukraine

While we are all cheering from the sidelines for Ukraine as it gets pummeled and as the Russian military continues to look like a paper bear, I find Tanner Greer’s analysis of policymaking in the New York Times to be just what we all need. In truth, it reflects some of the thoughts I have been sharing about the crisis. The difference is, Greer is far better informed about military matters than is  yours truly.

Greer applauds, as do we all, the rapid Western response to the Russian invasion. And yet, he questions policy made on the fly, without due consideration of potential consequences:

The extraordinary actions of the Western powers are a natural and proportional response to Vladimir Putin’s reckless resort to force. Yet it is precisely their naturalness that should make us wary. When disaster breaks, leaders do not have time to dissect the fine print of every policy option presented to them. Crisis cascades: Each update from the front presents decision makers with a new demand for action. In such circumstances, it is natural for the snap assessment or the emotionally charged judgment to eclipse the careful calculation of cost and benefit.

He continues:

Failure to slow down and examine the assumptions and motivations behind our choices may lead to decisions that feel right in the moment but fail to safeguard our interests, secure our values or reduce the human toll of war in the long run.

Greer argues at length that we erred in Iraq by acting too precipitously, and by failing to question the notion that we were obliged to bring democracy to the Arab world. That gauzy aspiration, which became legal tender in the run up to Iraq, seems now to have returned in our obligation to support democracy in Ukraine as against autocracy in Russia. In truth, we believe that the victory of democracy is inevitable, though, for now, it does not look quite so inevitable.

In the current international configuration, it feels good, I imagine, to destroy the Russian economy and to destroy the lives of all Russians by imposing crippling financial and economic sanctions.

And yet, as we and others have pointed out, if our sanctions regime causes certain countries around the world to replace the Petrodollar with the Petroyuan, we will not be feeling very triumphant.

Greer quotes foreign policy expert Michael Mazarr, who differentiates between policy made as a function of the outcomes we desire to obtain and policy made in order to express our inherent virtue:

Dr. Mazarr contrasts two modes of foreign policy decision making: The first follows what he calls a “logic of consequences.” Policymaking in this mode is concerned with the ultimate outcomes of a proposed policy; it is obsessed with managing the costs and benefits needed to secure its goal. The second approach, “the logic of appropriateness,” is driven instead by the moral imperative to do the right thing.

Tanner offers the words of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson as an example of intemperate rhetoric that will end up being dangerous.

Consider the declaration by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of Britain that “Vladimir Putin’s act of aggression must fail and be seen to fail.” Language like this is more concerned with what must happen for justice to be realized than with the realistic assessment of the range of scenarios that might happen if Mr. Johnson’s preferred policies are followed. In times of crisis, pronouncements like these are a dangerous foundation for policy.

Those of us who understand something about saving face understand that Johnson’s rhetoric leaves Putin no off ramp. It is likely to make him more recalcitrant and more violent and more destructive. It is not a negotiating position; it is a humiliating position.

Anyway, Greer explains that the Russian operation, while not going as planned, is not going that badly.

Despite the heroic resistance of Ukrainians and repeated operational blunders by the invading force, there are powerful reasons for Mr. Putin to remain optimistic about achieving his war aims. Ukraine is large; war, even the modern mechanized variety, is slow. But the most successful Russian advances have brought Russian troops more than 200 miles into Ukraine. This is approximately the distance that separates Baltimore from New York City.

Now, a war that was supposed to be a smash and grab operation has become siege and starve.

A slower war of siege and starve may not have been Mr. Putin’s original invasion plan, but it poses severe difficulties for the Ukrainian forces. It is unclear how long forces in Kyiv can withstand a siege. By one American estimate, once Kyiv is surrounded, its food supplies will last for only two weeks. Ukrainian forces in the east face a similar dilemma. If Kharkiv or Zaporizhya falls into Russian hands, the Ukrainians will have to decide between abandoning eastern Ukraine for a more defensible position or risk having their supplies cut off and their position surrounded.

What is the Russian negotiation position?

To cease hostilities, the Russians have already demanded that Ukraine recognize the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk, acknowledge Russian sovereignty over Crimea and amend its Constitution to ensure future neutrality. These demands will grow more onerous as the Russian advance creeps forward. Left unspoken in these negotiations is the matter of Western sanctions. Mr. Putin will require at least a partial face-saving victory to end this war. A promise to decrease sanctions might meet this need. This outcome would not be just, but it would hold the best potential for saving the most Ukrainian lives.

And yet, the West, flexing its muscle, has refused to negotiate with Putin. This posture might lead to a permanent occupation:

Refusal to settle on the part of the Ukrainians or their Western backers will likely lead the Russians to commit to the permanent occupation of the territory they’ve taken. This is the most probable outcome of any policy predicated on inflexible Western ultimatums. In this scenario, sanctions would stay in place for decades. A new iron curtain would fall across Europe, separating Belarus, Russia and occupied Ukraine from the West. Though terrible for the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, this may be a strategically stable and even strategically advantageous state for the United States and its NATO allies.

Our current victories over Russia, our success in rendering Russia a pariah nation, feel good in the short term, but might not work out in the long term. Besides, dare we notice that many large nations around the world continue to be allied with Russia. That includes China, India and apparently even Brazil:

Trapping a bear makes it more desperate, not less dangerous. Moscow, squeezed by sanctions and facing larger NATO military budgets, may resort to extraordinarily risky measures to forestall decline. It was precisely this logic — complete with the prospect of crushing restrictions by a superior economic power and weapons shipments to a weaker military foe — that led Hitler to Barbarossa and imperial Japan to Pearl Harbor. However, the authoritarian great powers of the 20th century, which gambled that escalating conventional military conflicts might bring Western rivals to the negotiating table before economic isolation reduced their own national power beyond repair, are unlike modern Russia in one key respect: Russia has nukes to gamble with.

Greer remarks that a protracted conflict, a siege and starve conflict, will cause more casualties than would a smash and grab operation.

Our desire to punish Mr. Putin for the evil he has unleashed in Ukraine must be carefully balanced against the lives that will be lost the longer this war lasts, the real risks of military escalation, the long-term security needs of Europe and the second-order effects a new iron curtain might have on other parts of American foreign policy — such as U.S. security commitments in East Asia and the health of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. To meet this challenge, we must keep our policy firmly rooted in the “logic of consequence.” Americans living generations from now will be grateful that in this moment of crisis, our policy was guided by careful calculation instead of emotional reaction.

Ah yes, Western policy is being run on emotion, not on reason. This is certainly not a very good thing.